Book Review by Rogers, H. J.
BOOK REVIEWS
A THEORY OF JUSTICE. By John Rawls. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
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(paperback). Reviewed by H. J. Rogers.*
"We may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hither-
to been a movement from Status to Contract." Henry Summer Maine,
Ancient Law.
If John Rawls has accomplished nothing else with A Theory of Juts
tice, he has managed to resurrect the contract theory from near oblivion
and to make the discussion of social ethics once again philosophically
respectable. Rawls has taken the political theories of Rousseau, Kant,
and Locke, social doctrines that profoundly influenced the Founding
Fathers, but which of late have been considered chiefly of historical inter-
est, and breathed powerful new life into them. His theory provides a
basis for regarding the Constitution of the United States as something
more than an ad hoc compromise which occurred at a particular point
in time.'
The vast outpouring of reviews and critical articles about A Theory
of justice in popular;2 legal,3 and philosophical4 periodicals bears articu-
late witness to the vast influence which this book has had in the relatively
brief period since its publication. The impact of the book is in part
due to its scope. There have been few political theorists since Plato
who have had the audactity to approach so grand a theme as justice
and who possess the nerve and brilliance to successfully deal with the
subject.
Furthermore, in recent years the various forms of positivism have
dominated the study of philosophy and jurisprudence, while the great
Supervising Attorney, clinical Programs, Ohio State College of Law.
'See generally M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TUB UNITED
STATES (1913); R. RuTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17761781 (1955).
2 See, e.g., Hampshire, BOOK REVIEW, THE N.Y. REV. BOOKS, February 24, 1972 at 34;
Cohen, BOOK REVIEW, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV. July 16,1972, at 1.
3 See, e.g., Brock, The Theory of Justice, Dworkin, The Original Position and Hatt, Rawlh
on Liberty and Its Priority in Symposium: John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 40 U. CI, L,
REV. 486 (1973); Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004 (1972);
Fried, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of justice, LXX
J. PHILOSOPHY 245; Nagel, Rawls on Justice, LXXXII PHILOSOPHICAL REV., No. 2 (April
1973).
5 The present state of jurisprudential thought is, perhaps, best illustrated by the classic
debate in the Harvard Law Review between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller, See Hart, Pos'.
uivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Poitlivihm
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV, 630 (1958). For a more
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majority of those who have thought seriously about questions of social
justice in recent years have adopted some variant of the principle of social
utility-the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number. This
latter group has agreed for the most part with Jeremy Bentham that
those who speak of the "natural rights of man" are, in the philosophical
sense, speaking purest nonsense. John Rawls stands, for the moment
complete exposition of their respective positions, see H. L A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961) and L. FULLER, THE MORALIY OF LAW (1964).
Hart is generally considered to stand for the proposition that the law as it is must be clearly
distinguished from one's notions of what the law ought to be. This doctrine was clearly set
forth by Austin:
The existence of law is one thing; its merits or demerit is another. Whether it be or
be not is one inquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard,
is a different inquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to
dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and
disapprobation.
J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DTERMINED 194 (1954). According to this
view the study of the law is as dispassionate as he study of molecular biology, and the method-
ology of the legal scholar becomes indistinguishable from that of any other scientist. Free
from notions of what is "right," the legal scholar's task is simply to ascertain what "is."
Harts position is much more complex than this, and he does indicate that there are some
instances "where the law seems to take too little note of moral principles." H. L A. HART,
THE MORALITY OF THE CRESIINAL LAW 53 (1965J. However, to those who would argue that
he is saying that there is both too much morality in the law and too little, Hart has this reply:
For it is perfectly consistent to urge that the law should only be used to repress ac-
tivities which do harm to others and also to insist that in doing this it should observe
certain principles of justice between different offenders: to insist that these principles
should be observed in the course of punishing people for the harm which they do,
does not concede that people may be punished even if they do no harm.
Id. at 53-54.
Professor Fuller is probably one of the few remaining "natural" lawyers with a non.theistic
orientation, but his position is extremely limited when compared to the vast sweep of some of
his predecessors-in-interest. Basically, Fuller argues that substantive and procedural justice
tend to go together and that a system which adheres to his procedural requirements, such as
the publication of laws, their universal application, and the absence of ex post facto laws, will
afford not only procedural justice but substantive justice as well. L FULLER, supra at 152-86.
This view seems to confuse the internal consistency, or, as it were, the "integrity" of a legal
sys:em with the normative content of a society's laws, and there is a real question whether or
not an internally consistent system of laws necessarily leads to substantive justice. The apart-
heid laws in the Union of South Africa, or the "justice" meted out in the various municipal
courts of this land, demonstrate that substantive and procedural justice do not always go hand-
in-hand.
The trend of academic philosophy in this century has been towards logical positivism and
linguistic analysis which, by and large, dismiss moral arguments and arguments about the
proper ends of action as "emotive" exhortations, and therefore beyond the reach of philosophi-
cal scrutiny. See, e.g., L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953) and
N. CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1965).
Consequently, A Theory of justice is part of what many would consider to be a retrograde
movement away from a fundamental skepticism about tht rational bases for ethical precepts.
See C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).
6 There are many variants of utilitarianism and the theory has been continually revised.
For a discussion of the general evolution of utilitarian theory, see H. SIDGWICK THE METHODS
OF ETHICS (7th ed. 1,507). The great historical works include DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE (1739); ADAm SMrTH, A THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTMENTS (1759);
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1789); and JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
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at least, against the tide, and A Theory of Justice is forcing drastic re-
evaluation of many modes of contemporary thought.
The legal community has acquiesced in the general dismissal of the
contract theorists, arguing that a mythological or theoretical contract is,
in the legal framework, simply no contract at all.7  There have been
a few legal scholars, such as Professor Fuller, who, by attempting to
separate the requirements of procedural justice from those of substantive
justice, have tried to defend the principles of natural law. But these
efforts have not been especially successful and, at any rate, have reduced
the grand sweep of natural law to the pro forma requirements of proce-
dural due process.8
Justice Holmes's statement that the law is simply a prediction of what
a court will do in a given case appears to be the underlying philosophy
of not only the active practitioner, who is perhaps justified in the adop-
tion of this crass principle, but of the legal scholar as well. The prime
difficulty with legal positivism, as an operative principle, is that it flies
in the face of many of our intuitive moral-and legal-sentiments. 10
To take but one example, the familiar saying, "It is better for 100
guilty persons to go free than one innocent man to be imprisoned,"
is antithetical to most utilitarian principles, as well as being almost entire-
ly outside of the ambit of respectable jurisprudential thought. And yet,
a substantial number of laymen, and a surprising number of lawyers,
will advance this precept as one of the prime axioms of the American
legal system. How does one reconcile a widely held intuitive concept,
such as the foregoing, with the realities of legal practice and with the
theoretical underpinnings of our legal system? John Rawls not only
gives us a ringing defense of the contract theory in A Theory of lustice,
but also provides a philosophical justification of many of the common
sense axioms of the Anglo-American legal system.
Rawls denominates his theory "justice and fairness" and lays out the
7 Professor Dworkin of Oxford Univrsity, among others, advances the purely legalistic
argument: "His contract is hypothetical, and hypothetical contracts do not supply an inde-
pendent argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not
simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all." Dworkin, The Original
Position, 40 U. CmI. L. REV. 500, 501 (1973) (emphasis added). This argument can, perhaps,
be met on its own terms. Once a person has relied on the provisions of a contract, he may
be estopped to deny that he is a party to the contract, and is th.refore bound by its provisions,
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
8 L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 33-94.
9 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
10 Although Rawls argues strongly against "intuitonism" (i.e., the idea that there Is a
plurality of first principles and that one simply makes arbitrary ad hoc decisions when con.
fronted with a conflict between first principles) he frequtntly alludes to "intuitive judgments,"
which, in his usage, are often starting points for a more detailed analysis.
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"main idea" in the first few pages of his book. It is a purely contractar-
ian theory, with the added gloss of what Rawls terms "the original posi-
tion." The original position is the hypothetical construct in which Rawls
places the parties to the social contract. His principles of justice are
those which free and rational people would have chosen if they had
to select certain social principles. The standard to be applied is that
of fairness. The principles chosen must be fair to all concerned, and
that which is fair is ipso facto, that which is just. Hence, justice as
fairness.
Rawls imposes one basic requirement on the parties in the original
position. Their choice of societal principles must be made behind "a
veil of ignorance," which means that the parties must make their election
of principles in a situation of complete ignorance of their own personal
traits, abilities, talents, and status or position in the society in which they
live. In the original position, they are even ignorant of their psychologi-
cal propensities and their conception of the "good."
Rawls obviously utilizes this simple device to eliminate all considera-
tions of a personal and individual nature from the judgments arrived
at by the parties in the original position. They are not, in any way,
prohibited from furthering their ideas of self-interest, enlightened or
otherwise, but the veil of ignorance clearly makes it extremely difficult
for those in the original position to advance anything other than the
generalized interests of humanity. For example, it is quite unlikely that
a person in the original position would advance a theory of racial or
masculine superiority, when he did not know the racial group to which
he belonged or the gender which he would assume when the veil of
ignorance was lifted. Furthermore, it seems equally unlikely that a per-
son in the original position would long argue for an aristocratic or mer-
itocratic society, if he did not know that he was endowed with a partic-
ular social position or personal attribute, such as intelligence or dili-
gence." On the contrary, it would appear to be highly rational-and
Rawls so argues-for the parties in the original position to initially adopt
a strictly egalitarian principle, such as the following, as their general
concept of justice: "All social values-liberty and opportunity, income
11 Rawls is quite adamant in the condemnation of what he terms to be "the liberal inter-
pretation" of justice, i.e., the allocation of distributive shares of a society's wealth upon some
principle of personal mtrit, ability or worth.
.. even if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies,
it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural
distribution of abilities and talents ... distributive shares are decided by the outcome
of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There
is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by
the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 73-74 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RAWLS].
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and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to every-
one's advantage.""
Rawls does not spend a great deal of time discussing this general
conception of justice, but rather advances what he terms a "special inter-
pretation" of the concept, the discussion of which comprises the bulk
of A Theory of justice. This special interpretation consists of two princi-
ples, the first of which is: "Each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all."' 3
A common sense version of Rawls's first principle might be the oft-
heard assertion, "Your freedom of action stops at the point of my nose."14
Hence, Rawls' first principle, although it places limitation upon liberty
is aimed at achieving a maximization of personal liberty. The basic con-
tractarian idea-which is the reciprocity of obligation-shines through
this formulation. In many ways, this principle appeals to one's notion
of procedural fairness.15  A person cannot legitimately claim a right or
privilege unless he is willing to extend that right or privilege to all other
members of society. This argument becomes especially telling when ad-
vanced in the original position, where each persons's personal vision is
clouded, as it were, by the veil of ignorance.
An example can possibly illustrate some of the far-reaching implica-
tions of Rawls's hypothetical construct. Absent the concept of the origi.
nal position, those who favor legislation against obscenity might argue:
"I do not want to read this filth. Furthermore, I do not think that any-
one should be permitted to read it. Therefore, I am quite willing to
cede, in perpetuity, my right to peruse novels that the responsible author-
ities have deemed obscene, and I can legitimately insist that others do
12 RAWI.s at 62.
13 RAWLS at 250.
14 Philosophers frequently use the adjectival phrase "common sense" to denote an idea or
concept that has a certain general currency. It normally has slightly pejorative connotations,
15 "The notion of pure procedural justice is best understood by a comparison with perfect
and imperfect procedural justice." RAWLS at 85. As an illustration of perfect proceduraljustice, Rawls utilizes the hoary example of a number of men dividing a cake, with the one
who wields the knife receiving the last piece. In this instance, there is both an independent
standard for deciding which outcome is just and a procedure which directly leads to the proper
conclusion.
"Imperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial"; this is because it is lmpos-
sible to "design the legal rules so that they will always lead to the correct result." RAWLS at
86. "The characteristic mark of imperfect procedural justice is that while there is an inde-
pendent criterion for the correct outcome, there is no feasible procedure which is sure to lead
to it." RAWLS at 86.
One of the real strengths of the concept of the original position is that it does afford both
an independent criterion for determining what is fair and a procedure which directly leads to
the result.
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the same." It would seem that this argument is largely precluded to
a person in the original position, because, quite apart from the very real
difficulties entailed in determining what is literature and what is pornog-
raphy, a person in the original position would not know whether he
would be incarnated as a libertine or as a bluenose when the veil of
ignorance was lifted.'" All that he would know is that he might have
some passing interest in the printed word, and therefore, it would seem
to be irrational for him to impose any restrictions whatsoever upon the
materials which appeared in the various publications of his society.' 7
If Professor Rawls had not advanced his argument beyond his first
principle, it might have been possible to have written him off as a simple-
minded egalitarian whose theories have little or no application to the
world that we inhabit. If he had not gone further, A Theory of Justice
could have been as easily dismissed by legal philosophers as the statement
that all men are created equal in the preamble to the Declaration of
Independence. These noble sentiments fly in the face of one's daily ob-
servations of the world, for it is only in the most narrow and limited
sense that people possess even the most basic political equality. Even
in this narrow sense (e.g., the right of universal adult sufferage), the
genetic and social lottery that determines personal identity inevitably pro-
duces a "natural" disparity between individuals as vast and unbridgeable
as that of the most caste-ridden society. Some people are simply more
valuable to the functioning society than other people; certain tasks are
more pleasurable than other tasks; and the chief mechanism by which
society rewards or punishes its members is by its allocation of social and
economic goods. Therefore, unless a theory of social justice can explain
the vast disparity which exists between the life situations of its members
-the Dive and the Lazuruse'--then the theory should properly be dis-
missed as utopian and quite at odds with any practical notion of earthly
justice.
It is with the argument that he advances in behalf of his second
principle that Professor Rawls makes a quantum leap from other theorists
who have argued the contractarian position. His second principle is: "So-
cial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the
16 If one has fairly certain notions about what is obscene, a reading of United States v.
One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 183 (1933) aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (1934) or Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) is a suggested remedy.
17 It is conceivable that the people in the original position might possibly adopt some limi-
tations on free speech, such as a limitation against the sale of pornographic materials to minors
or against "pandering." Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Ginsburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
18St. Luke 16: 19-31.
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just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.""' Rawls parts com-
pany with the egalitarians-simply by permitting social and economic
inequalities-and with the utilitarians, since his concept is completely
antithetical to the principle of utility, in all of its many formulations."
In The Brothers Karamazov, one of the characters asks whether a
just man could accept a society which required, as a condition precedent
to its establishment, the slaughter of an innocent child. The question
was answered in the negative because the child's scream would echo
throughout all of history, as a continual and eternal reminder to all peo-
ple of the murderous predicate of their society. Dostoyevsky's question
and the answer are, of course, couched in literary terms, but the dilemma,
however phrased, poses a great problem for the utilitarian, because his
philosophy requires him to answer in the affirmative. The acquiescence
in the murder of an innocent child, if that murder would somehow ensure
the happiness of all society, is a concept which a good utilitarian must
accept.
The counter argument can be made that the so-called dilemma is
arbitary in its premises and that the factual situation is so extreme that
it would never arise in the "real world," but if the question is squarely
presented,' it must be squarely answered. As Albert Camus once stated,
10 RAWLS at 302. Because of space limitations, the "just sayings principle" will not be
discussed in the body of this review., Essentially it deals with the question of justice between
generations. An example of the application of the principle might be the Marxian dogma
which requires the privation of the present generation(s) for the happiness of future genera-
tions. Under Rawls' formulation, the people in the original situation (who do not know to
which generation they belong) would determine the proper allocation of resources between
generations, i.e., they would decide in advance how much of the society's gross annual product
was to be allocated to the consumers and how much was to be re-invested, as it were, into
production for the benefit of future generations. RAWLS at 284-93.
20 Classical utilitarianism, according to Rawls' restatement of Henry Sidgwick, basically
holds that a society is just "when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the great-
est net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it." RAWLS at 22.
One of the leading variants is usually denominated "average utilitarianism," which takes
the position that society should maximize the average per capita utility, rather than the total
utility of scoiety. See Haranyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Eco nomics and the Theory of Risk
Taking, 61 JOUR. OF POL. EcON. 434 (1953). Rawls seriously considers the possibility that
people in the original position might choose the principle of average utility but seems to con.
dude that they would prefer his formulation instead:
Thus the expectation finally arrived at in the reasoning for the average principle
seems spurious for two reasons: it is not, as expectations should be, founded on one
system of aims; and since the veil of ignorance excludes the knowledge of the parties'
conception of their good, the worth to each of the total circumstances of others slm-
ply cannot be assessed. The argument ends up with a puiely formal expression for
an expectation but one without meaning. This difficulty about expectations is anal-
ogous to that concerning the knowledge of probabilities. In both instances the rea-
soning carries on with these notions after the basis for their legitimate use has been
ruled out by the conditions of the original position.
RAWLS at 175.
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"It is always easy to be logical. It is almost impossible to be logical
to the bitter end. ' 21
Or, to take a less extreme example alluded to earlier, a utilitarian
could easily argue that it is far better that an innocent person suffer
imprisonment, than for a hundred criminals to go free. The adoption
of this principle would discourage crime by increasing the relative likeli-
hood of conviction.
Rawls's second principle allows us to answer these questions in a fash-
ion which more closely approximates our intuitive concepts of justice than
do the superficially plausible answers of the utilitarian.2 On its face,
the second principle would seem to preclude the murder of the innocent
child, but that is such an extreme situation that the parties in the original
position, if the question were squarely put to them, could well choose
to permit the murder of the child, if that would ensure the future happi-
ness of all other persons. Under the theory of rational choice which
Rawls utilizes, the possible benefits are so great and the relative likeli-
hood of any given person in the original situation being the child (a
possibility which the veil of ignorance forces one to consider) are so very
small that reasonable people might ultimately come to the same conclu-
sion that utilitarians automatically reach in this particular case.'
The other example-the hundred to one chance of an apprehended
criminal being convicted-would, for obvious reasons, present a lesser
2 1 A. CAMuS, THE MyT-j OF SIsYPHUs AND OTHER ESSAYS 7 (1955).
In his later works, Camus seriously wrestled with the question of the justifiability of mur-
der. He turned for his model to the "fastidious assassins" of pre-revolutionary Russia and
concluded that if political murder is ever justifiable it is only in those circumstances where
the assasin (or politician, one is tempted to add) exchanges his life for that of his victim. That
way, Camus says, at least one can know that the decision to take another's life is a serious one.
A. CAmus, THE REBEL 1(4-73 (1956). Although Camus is more properly classified as a nov-
elist ra-her than as a philosopher, the condusion that he reached in this instance has very de-
cided contractarian overtones, and one supposed that Professor Rawls's disembodied souls in
the original position would not find Camus' position completely antithetical to their principles
of justice.
22 One of the crucial difficultjes with most forms of utilitarianism is that they seem to con-
flict, to some degree at least, with the ancient legal maxim that no person should be the judge
of his own case.
It could be argued that there is no one to make the disinterested judgment as to which
policies make for greater social utility, since everyone is a part of society and, therefore, has
certain interests to advance or prorect. Some variants of utilitarianism attempt to answer this
objection with the concept of "the impartial spectator," a fictional entity who organizes the de-
sires of all persons into one coherent system of desire. "Endowed with ideal powers of sym-
pathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identi-
fies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own." RAWLS at 28.
This construct, unlike the concept of the original position, would appear to beg the question in
the most egregious fashion. Who, pray tell, is the impartial spectator?
2 3 It should be noted that a strict application of the "maximim" rule, which is discussed
in Note 24 would preclude those in the original position from agreeing to the sacrifice of the
child.
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dilemma for those in the original position. Without attempting to fully
answer this question within the framework of Rawls's theory of justice,
one can easily imagine a party in the original position accepting this
ancient maxim of legal folklore as an operative principle, because of the
very pragmatic fear that, if he opted for another principle, he would
be the innocent party consigned to the penitentiary with the hundred
malefactors.24
One might argue that those in the original position would opt for
some form of anarchy, but let us assume for the moment that they would
agree with Thomas Hobbes that life in the state of nature (or the original
position) would be "solitary, lonely, nasty, brutish and short" and that
they would, therefore, choose to have some governmental structure, how-
ever skeletal, and that there would be some societal mechanism, however
minimal, for enforcing the judgment of the community against its recal-
citrant members. At the bare minimum, one can suppose that they
would agree that an individual in the society who persisted in wantonly
slaughtering all those that he encountered should, in some sense, be dealt
with on a communal basis. And once the decision to have some sort
of governmental structure is reached, those in the original position grap-
ple with the more difficult questions of how their "leaders" are to be
chosen and the manner in which they are to be compensated, directly
and by the perquisites of office, for the performance of their societal du-
ties.
Once can easily imagine a particularly self-interested person in the
original situation (although individual self-seeking is,, of course, pro-
scribed by the terms of the construct) crying out to all those who advo-
cate a retreat from the strictest sort of egalitarianism, "What's in it for
me?" An English Leveller or Jacksonian Democrat might assert, "Why
should I assent to permitting the .President to make $200,000 per year
when I make only $5,000. Why should I permit a heart surgeon to
live a life of physical ease when I have to eat: my bread in the sweat
24 One of the first questions that a colleague of mine asked after reading A Theory ol lItt.
lice was, "Why does Rawls assume that people are so conservative?" The criticism is quite
valid, because Rawls does appear to assume that the people in the original position are inordi.
nately risk-averse. They adopt the "maximin" rule for choice under uncertainty. The maxi.
min rule counsels one to choose the "best-worse" situation when confronted with a choice
between two or more alternatives, i.e., a person at the choice point is to elect the alternative,
the worst possible outcome of which is superior to the worst possible outcome of the other al.
ternatives. For a general discussion of this rule, see R. Lucii and H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECIsioNs 275-326 (1957).
To a large extent, the law also adopts extremely conservative principles in somewhat anal-
ogous situations, such as the requirement that a trustee must act prudently and cautiously in
the management of trust funds and have, as his primary objective, the preservation of the prin-
cipal of the trust. See generally, A. W. SCOTT, ABRIDGEMBNT OF THE LAW 01 TRUSTS 434-
58 (1960).
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of my brow. They're no better than I am. No sir, I am not going
to agree to that kind of arrangement."
Despite the seeming crassness of this argument, it does illustrate one
of the chief strengths of social contract theories in general and Rawls's
theory of justice in particular: The validity of the contract depends in
toto upon its being accepted unanimously. Any party to the contract
may decline to accept its terms and thereby, at the very least, force a
renegotiation of those provisions which he finds objectionable. The veto
power which each party has to the social contract is but another way
of stating the fundamental Kantian principle of universalization, i.e.,
when a person makes a moral choice, he should choose as if he were
choosing for all of humanity.25
These two moral formulations would appear to be but statements
of the same principle from different points of view. A Kantian is will-
ing to accept as universal those moral principles upon which he acts,
while a contractarian would insist upon a consensual universalization be-
fore he acts. The the untutored eye, it would appear to come to the
same thing.
Thus, when the self-seeking individual in the original position asks
"What's in it for me?", one of the patiently rational will be able to
explain to him precisely why, under Rawls's second principle of justice,
he should agree to certain social and economic disparities. Just as an
elementary teacher lectures the class dullard, it will be demonstrated that
the seeming economic and social advantages of the heart surgeon will
work out to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. "Don't you
see, if we require other people to prepare his tax returns and carry out
his garbage, he will be able to perform more operations." Reasoning
in this manner, Rawls argues, people in the original position would per-
mit certain social and economic inequalities, if, and only if, all persons
would directly benefit from those inequalities. They would also allow
certain individuals to hold high office, since all persons, and especially
the least advantaged, would benefit from this arrangement. They would
permit these inequalities, even if it turned out that they inhabited the
lower depths of the society because, they would still emerge as ultimate
winners. The social and genetic lottery that they would enter, once the
veil of ignorance was lifted, might possibly catapult them into a position
of power and influence, and, if it did not, any citizen would still be
25 According to Rawls, it is a mistake to emphasize the place of generality and universality
in Kant's ethics, since these ideas are hardly new with him. However, Kant serves as a con-
venient peg on which to bang these concepts, since Kant systematized them far beyond any of
those who went before him. See generally, L W. BECK, A COMMENTARY ON KAT'fS
CRITiQuE OF PRAcncAL RAsoN (1960).
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in a better position than he would have been if he had not permitted
the social and economic disparities, because of the preconditions which
Rawls affixes to them.
A more controversial aspect of A Theory of Justice is the priority
rules which Professor Rawls attaches to his tw6 principles of justice, He
proposes to arrange his principles in a serial or lexical order."" Simply
put, Rawls assigns to his first principle, i.e., "the principle of greatest
equal liberty," an absolute priority over all other values, so that liberty
may be restricted only for the sake of greater liberty and not for any
other social value:
... I shall in fact, propose an ordering of this kind by ranking the prin-
ciple of equal liberty prior to the principle regulating economic and so.
cial inequalities. This means, in effect, that the basic structure of society
is to arrange the inequalities of wealth and authority in ways consistent
with the equal liberties required by the preceding principle.27
The only prior requirement Rawls imposes before this priority rule
would come into play is that the society must have attained a certain
level of economic well-being.28 This, of course, makes a certain intuitive
sense, since it is largely pointless to discuss liberty with a starving man,
who would gladly trade his birthright for a mess of pottage. It is Rawls's
position that once this minimal level of economic development is reached,
people in the original position will choose the absolute priority of liberty
over all social and economic values. Liberty means to Rawls such basic
things as the right to vote and to stand for office; freedom of speech
and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; and the
26 The proper term is "lexicographical," which Rawls rejects as "too cumbersome." RAWLS
at 42-43.
The first priority rule reads as follows:
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive lib.
erty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all, (b) a less than equal
liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty.
RAWLS at 302.
There is a "second priority rule," which is not discussed in this review, that deals with the
priority of justice over efficiency and welfare. RAWLS at 302-03. The second rule applies to
inequalities of opportunity and the proper societal rate of saving. Here, as with Rawls's other
precepts, the differentials must be acceptable to those who are on the receiving end of the In-
eqtality.
27 RAWLS at 43.
28 RAWLS at 543:
.. . as the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance for our
good of further economic and social advantages diminishes relative to the interests
of liberty, which become stronger as the conditions for the exercise of the equal free-
doms are more fully realized. Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irra-
tional from the standpoint of the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty
for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office.
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right to hold personal property.29 It appears, however, that Rawls even-
tually includes as liberties most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights and ends up being as much an absolutist as Justice Black. "Con-
gress shall make no law abridging. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 30 It is
this absolute priority which Rawls assigns to liberty which has been the
portion of his book which has received the most telling criticism to date.3'
Professor Dworkin of Oxford University has suggested that a "tenta-
tive initial classification" of political theories which employ the social
contract as an intermediate devise might be made according to the "deep
theory" upon which the theories are predicated. He then makes a tripar-
tite division of deep theories into those which are (1) goal-based, (2)
right-based, and (3) duty based.32 Examples of a goal based theory,
which entails the posting of some ultimate social summum bonum, would
9 RAw.S at 61:
The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to
vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assem-
bly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the personal along
with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and
seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.
It should be noted that RawJs does not argue that each person must possess an equal
amount of personal property; inequalities here would apparently be permitted, but only insofar
as they benefit the least advantaged, in accordance with his second principle of justice.
With regard to the question whether or not the means of production and the natural re-
sources of the society are to be publicly or privately owned, Rawls takes no position.
Which of these systems and the many intermediate forms most fully answers to the
requirements of justice cannot, I think, be determined in advance. There is presum-
ably no general answer to this question, since it depends in large part upon the tra-
ditions, institutions, and social forces of each country, and its particular historical
circumstances. The theory of justice does not include these matters.
RAW-S at 274.
30 Hugo Black and William Douglas have, by and large, taken the position that this phrase
is to be given a liberal reading, i.e., the federal government is absolutely prohibited from pass-
ing any law abridging the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Also, under
their view the various state governments are likewise prohibited from enacting restraints on
freedom of the press because of the "incorporation" of the first amendment into the four-
teenth amendment See e.g., New York Times v. Suvlira,, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (concur-
ring opinion).
31As was noted earlier, Rawls simply will not permit any trade off of liberty, however
minimal, for social and/or economic advantages, however great. Furthermore, he does not at-
tempt to differentiate between the various basic liberties which he enumerates, although it is
obvious that a better case could be made for some, e.g., liberty of conscience, than for others.
It very well may be that Rawls has permit:ed one of his personal biases to affect the course of
his argument, which does purport to rest upon a form of self-interest rather than idealism.
I think that the apparently dogmatic course of Rawls's argument for the priority of
liberty may be explained by the fact that, though he is not offering it merely as an
ideal, he does harbour a latent ideal of his own, on which he tactily draws when he
represents the priority of liberty as a choice which the parties in the original position
must, in their own interest, make as rational agents choosing from behind the veil of
ignorance. The ideal is that of a public-spirited citizen who prizes political activi-
ties and service to others as among the chief goods of life....
Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. CHi. L REV. 534-554 (1973).
3 2 Dw6rkin, supra note 7, at 522.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
be utilitarianism and, perhaps, communism; examples of duty-based the-
ories would be Kant's categorical imperatives and the Mosaic law, where
the affirmative duty to obey a particular code or set of precepts is taken
as fundamental. As examples of right-based theories, Dworkin cites
Thomas Paine's theory of revolution and John Rawls's A Theory of Jus-
tice. Dworkin makes some interesting points in his discussion of right-
based theories:
Right-based theories are, in contrast, concerned -with the independence
rather than the conformity of individual action. They presuppose and
protect the value of individual thought and choice .... Right-based the-
ories . . . treat codes of conduct as instrumental, perhaps necessary to
protect the rights of others, but having no essential value in themselves.
The man at their center is the man who benefits from others' compli-
ance, not the man who leads the life of virtue by complying himself.18
If this distinction has any validity,34 it would appear to afford some
rationale in support of the priority which Rawls assigns to the value
of liberty, perhaps a better rationale than Rawls himself advances, In
other words, the very nature of the theory which Rawls is advancing
may require the priority of liberty, and, this, of course could constitute
a serious defect, since, if true, it seems to require an a priori assumption
of what Rawls is attempting to demonstrate logically. However, before
the absolute priority of liberty is required by Rawls, the society must
have attained a certain minimal economic level. Rawls's premise appears
to be that once this "floor" has been achieved man would necessarily
opt for personal liberty as the prime social good.
Rawls offers two chief examples of justifiable restrictions on personal
liberty for the sake of greater liberty. The first is military conscription
to defend the society against an external enemy; and the other is the
restriction of an intolerant sect which threatens the security of the society.
The first example is explicable within the terms of Rawls's theory, but
the second would appear to be open to question. Would Rawls permit
a religious sect to be abolished merely because it introduced "false divin-
ities"? A Theory of Justice does not provide a firm answer to this funda-
mental question, although the terms of the original position would seem
to preclude this action.
It is a fundamental point of Professor Rawls' book that the selection
of the principles of justice by the parties in the original position is only
33 Id. at 523.
34 Professor Dworkin recognizes that his distinctions are "saperficial and trivial as ideologi-
cal socio!ogy." However, they do have a certain usefulness: "My point is only to suggest thut
these differences in the character of a political theory are important quite apart from the de-
tails of position that might distinguish one theory from another of the same character." Id.
at 524.
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the first step of a four-stage process. Once this is done, the parties then
move from the original position to a "constitutional convention" and,
as the second step, they write a constitution which establishes the basic
rights and liberties of the citizenry. The third stage is that of legislation,
the enacting of statutes in accordance with the principles of justice
adopted in the original position and with the constitution. The fourth
and last stage is the application of these "statutes" to particular cases
by the officials of the society.
If the reader at this point, should feel that Rawls's conception sounds
suspiciously like American history, he is not without good company.!'
One wonders why Rawls did not go the full distance, like the South
Vietnamese and require a bicameral legislature, or, like the Japanese, and
establish a supreme judicial body to "interpret" the laws.
These few points are minor quibbles concerning some of the periph-
eral areas of an otherwise magnificant piece of work. 0 -Rawls provides
the most forceful theoretical defense that the constitutional form of gov-
ernment has received in a long time, and one only wishes that those
who inhabit Langdell Hall would sometimes venture across Massachusetts
Avenue to the Harvard Yard. They might learn something about justice.
3 5 "One form of criticism has been expressed to me by many colleagues and students, par-
ticularly lawyers. They point out that the particular political institutions and arrangements
that Rawls says men in the original position would choose are merely idealized forms of those
now in force in the United States." Id. at 533.
36 Id. at 533. In some general remarks about moral theory, Rawls makes this observa-
tion:
We need to be tolerant of simplications, if they reveal and approximate the general
outlines of our judgments. Objections by way of counter-examp!es are to be made
with care, since these may tell us only what we know already, namely that our theory
is wrong somewhere .... All theories are presumably mistaken in places. The real
question az any given time is which of the views already propo.ed is the best approx-
imation overall.
RAWLS at 52. A contractarian should not object if he is held to his own standards. And for
those who try to make some sense of the legal system in this country, A Theory of Justice
would appear to be one of the very best approximations overall.
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